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Abstract-Although most commonly occurring default rules are normal when viewed in isolation, they can 
interact with each other in ways that lead to the derivation of anomalous default assumptions. In order to 
deal with such anomalies it is necessary to re-represent these rules, in some cases by introducing 
non-normal defaults. The need to consider such potential interactions leads to a new concept of integrity, 
distinct from the conventional integrity issues of first order data bases. 
The non-normal default rules required to deal with default interactions all have a common pattern. 
Default theories conforming to this pattern are considerably more complex than normal default theories. 
For example, they need not have extensions, and they lack the property of semi-monotonicity. 
Current semantic network representations fail to reason correctly with defaults. However, when viewed 
as indexing schemes on logical formulae, networks can be seen to provide computationally feasible 
heuristics for the consistency checks required by default reasoning. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In an earlier paper [l] one of us proposed a logic for default reasoning. The objective there was 
to provide a representation for, among other things, common sense facts of the form “Most A’s 
are B’s”, and to articulate an appropriate logic to characterize correct reasoning using such 
facts.? One such form of reasoning is the derivation of default assumptions: given an individual 
which is an A, conclude that “This particular A is a B”. Because some A’s are not B’s this 
conclusion must be treated as a default assumption or belief about the world, since subsequent 
observations in the world may yield that “This particular A is not a B”. The derivation of the 
belief that “This particular A is a B” is a form of plausible reasoning which is typically required 
whenever conclusions must be drawn from incomplete information. 
It is important o note that not all senses of the word “most” lead to default assumptions. 
One can distinguish two such senses: 
(1) A purely statistical connotation, as in “Most voters prefer Carter.” Here, “most” is 
being used exclusively in the sense of “the majority of”. This setting does not lead to default 
assumptions: given that Maureen is a voter one would not want to assume that Maureen prefers 
Carter. Default logic makes no attempt o represent or reason with such statistical facts. 
(2) A prototypical sense, as in “Most birds fly.” True, there is a statistical connotation 
here-the majority of birds do fly-but in addition a characteristic of a prototypical or normal 
bird is being described in the following sense: given a bird Polly, one is prepared to assume that 
it flies unless one has reasons to the contrary.* It is towards such prototypical settings that 
default logic is addressed. 
The concept of a prototypical situation is central to the frames proposal of [5] and is 
realized in such frame inspired knowledge representation languages as KRL[6] and FRL[7]. 
That these are alternative representations for some underlying logic has been convincingly 
argued in [S]. Default logic presumes to provide a formalization of this underlying logic. 
The approach taken by default logic is to distinguish between prototypical facts, such as 
“Typically dogs bark”, and “hard” facts about the world such as “All dogs are mammals” or 
tOther closely related work with much the same motivation is described in [2-4]. 
iOne way of distinguishing between these IWO senses of “most” is by replacing its setting using the word “typically”. 
Thus, “Typically voters prefer Carter” sounds inappropriate, whereas “Typically birds fly” feels correct. In the rest of this 
paper we shall use “typicall!” whenever we are referring to a prototypical situation. 
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“Scott wrote Waverly”. The former are viewed as rules of inference, called default rules, which 
apply to the “hard” facts. The point of view is that the set of all “hard” facts will fail to 
completely specify the world-there will be gaps in our knowledge-and that the default rules 
serve to help fill in those gaps with plausible but not infallible conclusions. A default theory 
then is a pair (D, W) where D is a set of default rules applying to some world being modelled, 
and W is a set of “hard” facts about that world. Formally, W is a set of a first order formulae 
while a typical default rule of D is denoted 
44: m,(x), . . . Wn(x) 
w(x) 
where CT(X), /3,(x), . . . P”(x), w(x) are all first order formulae whose free variables are among 
those of x = xl, . . . x,. Intuitively, this default rule is interpreted as saying “For all individuals 
Xl, * * * &n, if (Y(X) is believed and if each of p,(x), . . . P”(x) is consistent with our beliefs, then 
w(x) may be believed.” The set(s) of beliefs sanctioned by a default theory is precisely defined 
by a fixed point construction in [I]. Any such set is called an extension for the default theory in 
question, and is interpreted as an acceptable set of beliefs that one may entertain about the 
world being represented. 
It turns out that the general class of default theories is mathematically intractable. Accord- 
ingly, many of the results in [l] (e.g. that extensions always exist, a proof theory, conditions for 
belief revision) were obtained only for the class of so-called normal default theories, namely 
theories all of whose defaults have the form ’ 
a(x) : Mw(x) 
w(x) 
Such defaults are extremely common: for example “typically dogs bark.“: 
DOG(x): M BARK(x) 
BARK(x) ’ 
“Typically American adults own a car.“: 
AMERICAN(x) A ADULT(x): M((Ey) . CAR(y) A OWNS(x, y)) 
(Ey) . CAR(y) A OWNS(x, .v) 
Many more examples of such normal defaults are described in [l]. Indeed, the claim was made 
there that all naturally occurring defaults are normal. Alas, this claim appears to be true only when 
interactions involving default rules are ignored. For normal default heories uch interactions can 
lead to anomalous conclusions. 
It is the purpose of this paper to describe a variety of settings in which interactions 
involving defaults are important, and to uniformly generalize the notion of a normal default 
theory so as to correctly treat these interactions. The resulting semi-normal default theories 
will then be seen to have some interesting properties: for example they need not have 
extensions, and they lack the semi-monotonicity property which all normal theories enjoy. We 
shall also see that the interactions introduced by default rules lead to a new concept of data 
base integrity, distinct from the integrity issues arising in first order data bases. A final objective 
of this paper is to analyze current network representations with respect to their ability to 
correctly reason with defaults. On this count such representations will be found deficient. 
However, when viewed as indexing schemes on logical formulae, networks will be seen to 
redeem themselves; they can provide computationally feasible heuristics for the consistency 
checks required by default reasoning. 
2. INTERACTING NORMAL DEFAULTS 
In this section we present a number of examples of default rules which, in isolation, are 
most naturally represented as normal defaults but whose interaction with other defaults or first 
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order formulae leads to counterintuitive results, In each case we show how to “patch” the 
representation i order to restore the intended interpretation. The resulting “patches” all have a 
uniform character, which will lead us in Section 4.2 to introduce the notion of a semi-normal 
default theory. 
2.1 “ Typically” is not necessarily transitive 
Consider: 
“Typically A’s are B’s: A(x): MB(x) 
B(x) 
(2.1) 
“Typically B’s are C’s: 
(2.2) 
These are both normal defaults. Default logic then admits the conclusion that “Typically A’s 
are C’s” in the following sense: if a is an individual for which A(a) is known or believed, and if 
-B(a) and -C(a) are not known or believed, than C(a) may be derived. In other words, 
normal default theories impose transitivity of typicality judgments. But these need not be 
transitive, for example: 
“Typically high school dropouts are adults.” 
I “Typically adults are employed.” 
(2.3) 
From these one would not want to conclude that “Typically high school dropouts are 
employed.“* Transitivity must be blocked. This can be done in general by replacing the normal 
default (2.2) by the non-normal default 
B(x) : M(-A(x) A C(x)) 
C(x) . 
(2.4) 
To see why this works, consider a prototypical individual a which is an A, i.e. A(a) is given. By 
(2.1) B(a) can be derived. But B(a) cannot be used in conjunction with (2.4) to derive C(a) 
since the consistency condition -A(a) A C(a) of (2.4) is violated by the given A(a). On the 
other hand, for a prototypical individual b which is a B (i.e. B(b) is given) (2.4) can be used to 
derive C(b) since we do not know that A(b)-so that the consistency condition of (2.4) is 
satisfied. 
The introduction of non-normal defaults like (2.4) is a particularly unpleasant solution to the 
transitivity problem, for as we shall see in Section 4.2, the resulting non-normal default theories 
lack most of the desirable properties that normal theories enjoy. For example, they sometimes 
fail to have an extension, they lack semi-monotonicity, and their proof theory appears to be 
considerably more complex than that for normal theories. Accordingly, to the extent that it can 
be done, we would prefer to keep our representations “as normal as possible”. Fortunately 
transitivity can be blocked using normal defaults whenever it is the case that in addition to (2.1) 
and (2.2) we have “Typically B’s are not A’S” This is the case for example (2.3): “Typically 
adults are not high school dropouts.” Under this circumstance, the following normal represen- 
tation blocks transitivity: 
A(x): MB(x) 
B(x) 
B(x): M -A(x) 
- A(x) 
(2.5) 
(2.6) 
B(x) A - A(x): MC(x) 
C(x) ’ 
(2.7) 
+Nor would we want to conclude that “Typically high school dropouts are not employed.” Rather we would remain 
agnostic about the employment status of a typical high school dropout. 
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Notice how, when given that B(a), a simple back-chaining interpreter would establish the 
goal C(a). Back-chaining into (2.7) yields the subgoal B(a) A -A(a). This splits into the 
subgoal B(u), which is given and hence solved, and the subgoal -A(u). This latter back-chains 
into (2.6) yielding the subgoal B(u) which is solved. There remains only to verify the 
consistency requirements associated with the defaults (2.6) and (2.7) entering into the proof, i.e. 
to verify that {C(u), - A(u)} is consistent with all of the first order formulae in force. Such a 
back-chaining default reasoner is an incomplete realization of the complete proof procedure of 
[l]. The reader might find it instructive to simulate this back-chaining interpreter for the case 
that A(u) is given, in order to see how a derivation of C(u) is prevented. 
Notice also that the representation (2..5)-(2.7) yields a very interesting prediction. Given an 
individual a which is simultaneously an instance of A and B, we cannot conclude C(u). This 
prediction is confirmed with respect to example (2.3): Given that John is both a high school 
dropout and an adult, we do not want to assume that John is employed. Notice that the 
non-normal representation (2.1) and (2.4) yields the same prediction. We shall have more to say 
about defaults with common instances of their prerequisites in Section 2.3.t 
A somewhat different need for blocking transitivity arises when it is the case that “Typically 
A’s are not C’s”, i.e. in addition to (2.1) and (2.2) we have 
A(x) : M - C(x) 
-C(x) . (2.8) 
For example, 
“Typically university students are adults.” 
“Typically adults are employed.” (2.9) 
“Typically university students are not employed.” 
Under these circumstances, consider a prototypical instance a of A. By (2.1) and (2.2) C(u) can 
be derived. But by (2.8) -C(u) can be derived. This means that the individual a gives rise to 
two different extensions for the fragment default theory (2.1), (2.2) and (2.8). One of these 
extensions-the one containing C(u)-is intuitively unacceptable; only the other extension- 
the one containing -C(u)-is admissible. But a fundamental premise of default logic is that any 
extension provides an acceptable set of beliefs about a world. The problem then is to eliminate 
the extension containing C(u). This can be done by replacing the normal default (2.2) by the 
non-normal (2.4), exactly as we did earlier in order to block the transitivity of “typically”. Now, 
given A(u), B(u) can be derived from (2. l), and -C(u) from (2.8). C(u) cannot be derived using 
(2.4) since its consistency requirement is violated. On the other hand, given a prototypical 
instance b of B, C(6) can be derived using (2.4). 
Once again a non-normal default has been introduced, something we would prefer to avoid. 
As before, a normal representation can be found whenever it is the case that “Typically B’s are 
not A’s.” This is the case for example (2.9): “Typically B’s are not A’s.” This is the case for 
example (2.9): “Typically adults are not university students.” Under this circumstance the 
following normal representation will do: 
A(x) : MB(x) 
B(x) 
B(x) : M - A(x) 
- A(x) 
B(x) A - A(x): MC(x) 
C(x) 
A(x) : M - C(x) 
-C(x) * 
tIf 
a: m(x), . MB.(x) 
w(x) 
is a default rule then a(x) is its prerequisite. 
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Typically A's are B's. 
I Default Representation 
Typically B's are C's. 
(2x1 . A(x) 3 - C(x) 
I A(x) : “B(X) NO A isa C. B(x) 
I B(X) : new 
lx1 . A(x) 3 C(X) 
All A’S are C’s. 
A(x) : MB(X) 
B (xl 
B(X) : MC(x) 
C(X) 
A(x) : MB(x) 
Typically A'S are C'S. 
B (xl 
B(x) : MC(X) 
C(X) 
It is not the case that' 
A's are typically C'S. 
Transitivity must be blocked 
A(x) : MB(x) 
B(X) 
B(x) : MC- A(x) A C(x)) 
C(X) 
A(x) : MB(x) 
Typically B's are not 
A'S. It is not the caSe 
that A's are typically 
C'S. Transitivity must be 
blocked. 
B(x) 
B(x) : M - A(x) 
- A(x) 
B(x) h - A(x) : MC(x) 
C(X) 
A(x) : MB(x) 
B(x) 
Typically A'S are not B(x) : M(- A(x) h C(X)) 
C'S . C(X) 
A(x) : M - C(x) 
- C(X) 
A(x) : MB(x) 
B(X) 
Typically B's are not 
A'S. 
Typically A'S are not 
C'S . 
B(x) : M - A(x) 
- A(x) 
B(x) A - A(x) : MC(X) 
C(X) 
A(X) : M - C(x) 
- C(X) 
Fig. 1. 
Notice that this representation predicts that any individual which is simultaneously an 
instance of A and B will be an instance of not C, rather than an instance of C. This is the case 
for example (2.9): given that Maureen is both a university student and an adult one wants to 
assume that Maureen is not employed. 
Figure 1 summarizes and extends the various cases discussed in this section. The first three 
entries of this table are unproblematic ases which were not discussed, and are included only 
for completeness. 
2.2 Interactions between “all” and “typically” 
Phenomena closely related to those stemming from the non-transitivity of “typically” arise 
from interactions between normal defaults and certain universally quantified first order for- 
mulae. Consider 
“All A’s are B’s.” (x)4x) 1 B(x) (2.10) 
“Typically B’s are c’s” B(x) : MC(x) 
C(x) * 
(2.11) 
Default logic forces the conclusion that “Typically A’s are C’s” in the sense that if a is a 
prototypical A then it will also be a C. But this conclusion is not always warranted, for 
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“All 21-yr-olds are adults.” 
“Typically adults are married.” (2.12) 
Given that John is a 21-yr-old, we would not want to conclude that he is married. To block the 
unwarranted erivation, replace (2.11) by 
B(x): M( - A(x) A C(x)) 
C(x) . 
(2.13) 
As was the case in Section 2.1 the introduction of this non-normal default can be avoided 
whenever it is the case that “Typically B’s are not A’s”+ by means of the representation (2.10) 
together with 
B(x) : M - A(x) 
- 4x1 I 
(2.14) 
B(x) A - A(x) : MC(x) 
C(x) * 
Notice that this representation, as well as the representation (2.10) and (2.13) predicts that 
no conclusion is warranted about the C-tress of any given common instance of A and B. 
A related problem arises when it is the case that “Typically A’s are not c’s” so that, in 
addition to (2.10) and (2.11) we have 
A(x): M - C(x) 
-C(x) . 
(2.15) 
For example: 
“All Quebecois are Canadians.” 
“Typically Canadians are native English speakers.” 
“Typically Quebecois are not native English speakers.” 
As in Section 2.1, a prototypical instance a of A will give rise to two extensions for the 
theory (2.10), (2.11) and (2.15), one containing C(a); the other containing -C(a). To eliminate 
the extension containing C(a), replace (2.11) by (2.13). 
As before, the introduction of the non-normal default (2.13) can be avoided whenever it is 
the case that “Typically B’s are not A’s”, by means of the representation (2.10), (2.14) and 
(2.15). 
Figure 2 summarizes the cases discussed in this section. The first three entries of this table 
are unproblematic cases which were not discussed, and are included only for completeness. 
2.3 Conflicting default assumptions: prerequisites with common instances 
In this section we discuss the following pattern, in which a pair of defaults have contradic- 
tory consequents but whose prerequisites may share common instances:$ 
A(x): M - C(x) ~ 
- C(x) 
(2.16) 
B(x) : MC(x) 
C(x) . ’ 
tNote that example (2.12) seems not to have this character. One is unlikely to include that “Typically adults are not 21 
years old” in any representation of a world. 
*If 
a(x): MB,(x), . ML?.(x) 
w(x) 
is a default rule, then (I(X) is its prerequisife and w(x) its consequent. 
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All A's are 8'5. 
Default Representation 
~mally B's are C'S. 
(x) . A(x) 3 C(x) 
NO A ,.~a C. (x1 A(X) 1 B(x) 
B(X) : MC(X) 
C(X) 
I (xl A(x) 1 C(x) 
All A's are C'S 
I 
(xl . A(x) 3 B(x) 
B(x) : MC(x) 
(x) A(x) 3 B(x) 
Typically A'S are C's . B(x) : MC(x) 
C(X) 
It 1s not the case that A'S 
are typically C's Translti- 
vity must be blocked. 
(x1 A(x) 3 B(x) 
B(x) : HI- A(x) h C(x)) 
C(X) 
Typically B's are not A'S. (x1 . A(x) 3 B(x) 
It is not the case that A'S B(x) : M - A(x) 
are typically C's. Transi- - A(x) 
tivity must be blocked. 
B(x) A - A(x) : "C(x) 
C(X1 
(x) . A(x) 3 B(x) 
B(x) : MI- A(x) " C(X)) 
Typically A's are not C'S. C(X) 
A(x) : M - C(x) 
- C(X) 
(x) . A(x) 3 B(x) 
B(x) : M - A(X) 
'Typically B'S ale not A's. - A(x) 
'Typically A's are not C's. 
B(x) n - A(x) : MC(x) 
C(X) 
A(x) : M - C(X) 
- C(X) 
Fig. 2 
The problem here is which default assumption (if any) should be made when given an instance 
a of both A and B, i.e. should C(a) be assumed, or -C(a) or neither? Two cases have already 
been considered: 
(1) If it is the case that all A’s are B’s, then row 6 and possibly row 7 of Fig. 2 provide 
representations; in both -C(a) is derivable whenever A(a) and B(a) are simultaneously given. 
(2) If it is the case that “Typically A’s are B’s” then row 6 and possibly row 7 of Fig. 2 
provide representations in both of which - C(a) is derivable given A(a) and B(a). 
The problematic setting is when there is no entailment relationship between A and B. For 
example: 
“Typically Republicans are not pacifists.” 
“Typically Quakers are pacifists.” I 
(2.17) 
Now, given that John is both a Quaker and a Republican, we intuitively want to make no 
assumptions about his warlike nature. This can be done in the general case by replacing the 
representation (2.16) by the non-normal defaults 
A(x): M( - B(x) A - C(x)) 
- C(x) 
(2.18) 
B(x) : M( - A(x) A C(x)) 
C(x) . , 
This representation admits that a typical A is not a C, a typical B is a C, but a typical A which 
is also a B leads to no conclusion. 
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When it is the case that “Typically A’s are not B’s” and “Typically B’s are not A’s” the 
non-normal defaults (2.18) can be replaced by the following normal ones: 
A(x): M - B(x) 
- B(x) 
B(x) : M - A(x) 
- A(x) 
4x) A - B(x): M - C(x) 
- C(x) 
B(x) A - A(x): MC(x) 
C(x) . 
This appears to be the case for example (2.17): 
“Typically, Republicans are not Quakers.” 
“Typically, Quakers are not Republicans.” 
It is not always the case that the pattern (2.16) should lead to no default assumptions for 
common instances of A and B. Consider: 
“Typically full time students are not employed.” 
“Typically adults are employed.” 
Suppose that John is an adult full time student. One would want to assume that he is not 
employed. So in general, given the setting (2.16) for which the default assumption -C is 
preferred for common instances of A and B, use the following non-normal representation: 
A(x): M - C(x) 
- C(x) 
B(x): M( - A(x) A C(x)) 
C(x) . 
Whenever, in addition, it is the case that “Typically B’s are not A’s,” use the following normal 
representation: 
A(x): M - C(x) 
- C(x) 
B(x): M - A(x) 
- A(x) 
B(x) A -A(x): MC(x) 
C(x) . 
3. DEFAULT INHERITANCE IN HIERARCHIES: NETWORK REPRESENTATIONS 
We have focused, in Section 2, on certain fairly simple patterns of default rules. Our choice 
of these patterns was conditioned by their frequent occurrence in common sense reasoning, and 
by the fact that they are typical of the kinds of default knowledge which various “semantic” 
network schemes presume to represent and reason with. Most such networks are designed to 
exploit the natural hierarchical organization of much of our knowledge about the world and rely 
heavily for their inferential power upon the inheritance of properties associated with a general 
class “down the hierarchy” to more restricted classes. Networks usually provide for defaults 
and their inheritance, although they do not all distinguish in their graphical notation between 
default rules and exception-free statements about the world.tS In any event those systems which 
tSo that the representations often appear to be inconsistent. See [9]. Of course, once a proper semantics is defined for 
the network[lO, 1 I] the apparent inconsistency evaporates. Advocates of the need to reason from inconsistent information 
are, in part, confusing default rules with first order facts about a world. 
$The SNePS system(l21 does make this distinction through the introduction of an “almost-all” “quantifier”. 
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deal with defaults appear to rely exclusively on a shortest path heuristic, 
network interpreter, for computing default inheritances in hierarchies[9,13]. 
To see what this device is and why it is deemed necessary, consider: 
“Typically, students are full time.” 
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embedded in the 
STUDENT(x): M FULL-TIME(x) 
FULL-TIME(x) 
“Typically, night students are not full time.” 
NIGHT-STUDENT(x): M - FULL-TIME(x) 
- FULL-TIME(x) 
“All night students are students.” 
(x). NIGHT-STUDENT(x) > STUDENT(x). 
A network representation for these facts might look something like that of Fig. 3. (We have 
slightly modified the notation of [13].) Now suppose that John is a night student. We want to 
conclude that he is not full time, not that he is full time. But what is to prevent a network 
interpreter from traversing the MEMBER and ISA link from John to NIGHT-STUDENT to 
STUDENT and thence via the default PROP link to FULL-TIME? Enter the shortest path 
heuristic. Basically this says that an individual, e.g. John, will inherit a property P provided 
there is a path from the node “John” to the node “P” and there is no shorter or equal length 
path from John to “not P”. This is a slightly more precise statement of that in 1141: 
“Any property true of a concept in the hierarchy is implicitly true of anything linked below 
it, unless explicitly contradicted at the lower level.” 
It is easy to see that this principle, as applied to Fig. 3, will prevent the unwarranted 
assumption that John is full time. 
Unfortunately, except in the simplest of cases, the shortest path heuristic is wrong. For 
example, consider a slightly embellished version of the Quaker-Republican defaults: 
“Typically, Quakers are pacifists.” 
“Typically, Republicans are hawks.” 
“No hawk is a pacifist.” 
Suppose that John is a Quaker Republican. Then there is a path from “John” to “PACI- 
FIST” as well as one from “John” to “-PACIFIST” and the former path is shorter than the 
latter. The shortest path heuristic would thus predict that John is a pacifist whereas intuitively 
no default assumption is warranted. 
Despite our criticism of the shortest path heuristic, we nevertheless feel that there is a 
FULL-TIME 
default 
PROP 
I;-; 
STUDENT _ . FULL-TIME 
NIGH+-&DENT 
Fig. 3. 
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profound implementation principle lurking here. One of the most serious computational 
difficulties afflicting default logic is the requirement that one test for the consistency of all of 
the default assumptions entering into a derivation. For example: 
“Typically birds fly except for penguins, ostriches, oil covered birds, dead birds, etc.” 
BIRD(x): MFLY(x) 
FLY(x) 
(x). PENGUIN(x) > - FLY(x) 
(x) .OSTRICH(x) > - FLY(x) 
etc. 
Now suppose given BIRD (tweety), and nothing else about tweety. Then FLY (tweety) can be 
derived provided that FLY (tweety) is consistent with all of the first order facts in the data 
base. One way of establishing consistency is by failing to derive a contradiction from all of the 
consequences of the formula FLY (tweety). Of course, it is undecidable in general whether or 
not a set of formulae is consistent, but let’s try anyway. From FLY (tweety) one can derive 
-PENGUIN (tweety), -OSTRICH (tweety), -DEAD-BIRD (tweety), etc. So with this method 
of performing the consistency check, one must consider all of the possible exceptions to the 
default rule about flying birds! Since the exceptions to flight are legion we are faced with a 
potentially overwhelming computation. Ideally, we do not want even to entertain the possibility 
of an exception unless the given facts naturally compel us to do so. The only way of testing 
consistency which avoids “conscious” consideration of all of the exceptions to flight is to begin 
with the given fact BIRD (tweety), and using only the first order facts in the data base derive all 
consequences of this; if -FLY (tweety) is not one of these consequences then consistency is 
guaranteed. 
Now consider Fig. 4 which is a network representation of this same setting. We can tell at a 
glance that FLY (tweety) is consistent with our knowledge: -FLY (tweety) is not derivable 
because there is no directed path from “tweety” to “-FLY”. Potential derivation chains in the 
logical representation are explicit us directed paths in the network representation. Now the 
consistency check which began with BIRD (tweety) and derived all consequences of this 
corresponds in the network to an exploration of all paths from “tweety”. If there is no such 
path to “-FLY” then the consistency of FLY (tweety) is assured. Now computationally the 
exploration of all directed paths beginning at node “tweety” might not appear very promising 
since the search will get mired in all of the links in that part of the hierarchy lying above the 
node “BIRD”. But recall that we are testing consistency only with respect to all of the first 
order facts about the world, not the default rules. Hence no path containing a default PROP link 
need be considered, and most network links are of this kind. Moreover, hierarchies tend to be 
shallower than they are broad. Hence the search for a path from “tweety” to “ - FLY” in the 
hierarchy above “BIRD” appears feasible. It follows that a good strategy is to perform a 
unidirectional search from “tweety”; if “- FLY” is not encountered, then the default assump- 
tion FLY (tweety) is acceptable. This strategy has the computationally important consequence 
that the myriad possible exceptions to flight are never “consciously” entertained. 
, 
twee ty DEAD-B-IRD 0ST;;CH PEiGUIN 
Fig. 4. 
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Now what is really going on here? The answer is apparent from the observation that a 
semantic network reflects a particular choice of an indexing scheme on formu1ae.t The indexing 
scheme is such that whenever an entailment relation logically holds between two nodes, then 
those nodes are connected by a directed path; network paths correspond to derivation chains in 
the underlying logical representation. The nonexistence of a path in Fig. 4 from “tweety” to 
“ - FLY” guarantees that -FLY (tweety) cannot be derived, i.e. that FLY (tweety) is consistent 
with the first order formulae of the data base. 
Now there exist far more sophisticated indexing schemes on formulae than any provided in 
the literature on semantic networks (see, for example, [16], or the indexing on clauses in 
PROLOG [17]). 
Normally such schemes are used to improve the efficiency of theorem provers although they 
can be used for the construction of plans in deductive search[l8]. The discussion of paths in 
networks and their relationship to consistency suggests another use of indices on formulae: the 
path structure of the index scheme can provide a powerful and computationally feasible 
heuristic for the consistency checks required in default reasoning. An example of such an 
heuristic is the following, with reference to our bird example: 
If node “-FLY” cannot be found within a sufficiently large radius r of the node “tweety” 
(i.e. if no directed path of length r or less from “tweety” to “-FLY” exists in the index 
structure) then it is likely that FLY (tweety) is consistent with the given first order data base. 
It seems to us that an heuristic of this kind is precisely the sort of resource limited 
computation required for common sense reasoning[9]. Moreover, there is a very good theoreti- 
cal justification for appealing to a resource limitation in this setting; consistency is not even a 
semi-decidable property of first order theories* so that some sort of heuristic must be applied. 
What is interesting about this formal analysis is that the nature of, and reasons for, at least one 
form of resource limited computation can be theoretically articulated. 
Notice also that this consistency heuristic is simply a path finding procedure for directed 
graphs. No deductions are performed. Rather, the non existence of a sufficiently long path of a 
certain form strongly suggests the consistency of some set of formulae. 
4. DISCUSSION 
In this section we discuss some issues raised by the results of the previous sections. 
Specifically, we address the question of data base integrity arising from default interactions, as 
well as some of the formal problems associated with the non-normal default rules introduced to 
correctly represent hese interactions. 
4.1 Integrity of default theories 
As we have seen, default rules can interact with one another in highly complex ways. The 
addition of a new default rule to a representation may create interactions leading to unwar- 
ranted conclusions, even though in isolation this rule may appear perfectly correct. 
This observation leads to a new concept of data base integrity, one with quite a different 
character than the integrity issues arising in data base management systems [ 191 or in first order 
data bases[20,21]. For such systems an integrity constraint specifies some invariant property 
which every state of the data base must satisfy. For example, a typical integrity constraint 
might specify that an employee’s age must lie in the range 16-99 yr. Any attempt o update the 
data base with an employee age of 100 would violate this constraint. Formally one can say that 
a data base satisfies ome set of integrity constraints if the data base is logically consistent with 
the constraints. The role of integrity constraints is to restrict the class of models of a data base 
to include as a model the particular world being represented. Now the objective of the default 
representations of Section 2 had precisely this character; we sought representations which 
would rule out unwarranted efault assumptions so as to guarantee a faithful representation of
real world common sense reasoning. But notice that there was no notion of an integrity 
constraint with which the representation was to be consistent. Indeed, consistency of the 
representation cannot be an issue at all since any default theory will be consistent provided its 
+The fact that networks are notational variants of logical formulae is by now a truism in Artificial Intelligence circles 
(see [IO. 151). 
t1.e. the consistent first order theories are not recursively enumerable. 
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first order facts are [I, Corollary 2.21. It follows that, while there is an integrity issue lurking 
here, it has a different nature than that of classical data base theory. 
We are thus led to the need for some form of integrity maintenance mechanism as an aid in 
the design of large default data bases. The natural initial data base design would involve 
representing all default rules as normal defaults, thereby ignoring those potential interactions 
of the kind analyzed in Section 2. An integrity maintenance system would then seek out 
possible sources of integrity violations and query the user as to the appropriate default 
assumptions to be made in this setting. Once the correct interpretation has been determined, the 
system would appropriately re-represent the offending normal default rules. For example, when 
confronted with a pair of default rules of the form (2.16), the system would first attempt o 
prove that A and B can have no common instance, i.e. that W U {(Ex).A(x) A B(x)} is 
inconsistent, where W is the set of first order facts. If so, this pair of defaults can lead to no 
integrity violation. Otherwise the system would ask whether a common instance of A and B is 
typically a C, a -C, or neither, and depending on the response would suitably re-represent the 
pair (2.16), if necessary by non-normal default rules. 
4.2 Semi-normal default theories 
In Section 2 we had occasion to introduce certain non-normal default rules in order, for 
example, to block the transitivity of “typically”. Inspection of the representations of that 
section will reveal that all such non-normal default rules share a common pattern; they all have 
the form 
A(x) : M(- B(x) A C(x)) 
C(x) . 
Accordingly, it is natural to define a default rule to be semi-normal iff it has the form 
a(x): WPh) A w(x)) 
w(x) 
where a, p and w are formulae of first order logic with free variables among x = x,, . . . x,. A 
default theory is semi-normal iff all of its default rules are semi-normal. Normal default rules 
are a special case of semi-normal, in which /3(x) is the identically true proposition, 
[l] investigates the properties of normal default theories. Among the results obtained there 
are the following: 
(1) Every normal theory has an extension. 
(2) Normal theories are semi-monotonic, i.e. if D, and D2 are sets of normal default rules 
and if E, is an extension for the theory (D,, W), then the theory (0, U D2, W) has an extension 
E2 such that E, G E2. 
One consequence of semi-monotonicity is that one can continue to maintain one’s old 
beliefs whenever a normal theory is updated with new normal defaults. Another is a reasonably 
clean proof theory. 
Unfortunately, semi-normal default theories enjoy none of these nice properties. For 
example, the following theory has no extension: 
:M(A A -B) 
A 
To see that semi-monotonicity may fail 
:M(B A -C) :M(C A -A) 
B c 
to hold for semi-normal theories consider the theory 
:M(A A B) 
B ’ 
This has unique extension Th({B}) where, in general, Th(S) is the closure of the set of formulae 
S under first order theoremhood. If,the new default rule (: M - A/ - A) is added to this theory 
a new theory is obtained with unique extension Th({ - A}) and this does not contain Th({B)). 
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Most of the formal properties of semi-normal default theories remain unexplored. Two 
problems in particular equire solutions: Under what conditions are extensions guaranteed to 
exist, and what is an appropriate proof theory? 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Default theories are complicated. Unlike theories represented in first order logic, default 
theories lack extensibility. Whenever a new default rule is to be added to a representation its 
potential interactions with the other default rules must be analyzed. This can lead to a 
re-representation of some of these defaults in order to block certain unwarranted erivations. 
All of which leads to a new concept of data base integrity, distinct from the integrity issues 
arising in first order data bases. These observations also suggest the need for a default integrity 
maintenance system as a tool for aiding in the design of large default data bases. Such a system 
would seek out potentially interacting defaults during the data base design phase and query the 
designer about the consequences of these interactions. 
Default theories are computationally intractable in principle because of the consistency 
checks required by their proof methods. Semantic networks provide an indexing scheme on first 
order formulae, but many other schemes are possible. An important role of indexing is the 
provision of an efficient heuristic for consistency checking without the need to perform 
deductions. Such consistency checks are prime examples of the kind of resource limited 
computations required in common sense reasoning. 
Semi-normal default theories are complicated. They have none of the nice properties that 
make normal theories so appealing. Most of their formal properties are totally unexplored. At 
the very least a proof theory is needed, as well as conditions under which extensions are 
guaranteed to exist. 
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